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ABSTRACT 
 
BLAKE SLONECKER: The Politics of Space: Student Communes, Political Counterculture, 
and the Columbia University Protest of 1968 
(Under the direction of Peter Filene) 
 
This thesis examines the Columbia University protest of April 1968 through the lens 
of space. It concludes that the student communes established in occupied campus buildings 
were free spaces that facilitated the protestors’ reconciliation of political and social 
difference, and introduced Columbia students to the practical possibilities of democratic 
participation and student autonomy. This thesis begins by analyzing the roots of the disparate 
organizations and issues involved in the protest, including SDS, SAS, and the Columbia 
School of Architecture. Next it argues that the practice of participatory democracy and 
maintenance of student autonomy within the political counterculture of the communes 
awakened new political sensibilities among Columbia students. Finally, this thesis illustrates 
the simultaneous growth and factionalization of the protest community following the police 
raid on the communes and argues that these developments support the overall claim that the 
free space of the communes was of fundamental importance to the protest. 
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Introduction 
 
Tom Hayden was never a student at Columbia University. Nevertheless, at two 
o’clock on the morning of April 26, 1968, he found himself “joining a silhouetted wave of 
students surging across Columbia’s grounds and entering, with a key volunteered by a 
graduate student, the darkened shell of Mathematics Hall.”1 James Kunen was among this 
“wave of students” that liberated the fifth academic building and created the final commune 
of 1968’s most famous student protest. In the ensuing days, Hayden—author of the New 
Left’s unofficial founding document, the Port Huron Statement—and Kunen—soon-to-be 
author of the obscure memoir of the protest, The Strawberry Statement—participated in a 
barrage of political meetings. Hayden remembered these as gatherings “with countless people 
wanting to be heard, disparate viewpoints needing to be explored, and an internal consensus 
having to be built.”2 Kunen, on the other hand, passed the time wondering “if the Paris 
Commune was this boring” and “whether Lenin was as concerned with the breast size of his 
revolutionary cohorts as I am.”3 Despite their disparate protest interests, Hayden and Kunen 
both chose to barricade themselves within Mathematics Hall and join hundreds of other 
students and “outside agitators” in communes across campus as they awaited the violent 
police eviction that would follow seventy-two hours later.  
 
1 Tom Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1988), 275. 
 
2 Ibid., 276. 
 
3 James Simon Kunen, The Strawberry Statement—Notes of a College Revolutionary (New York: 
Random House, 1969), 30. 
2The Columbia upheaval—which extended throughout the remainder of the spring 
after reaching its climax during the last week of April—marked the loudest and most widely 
noted university protest in a year distinguished by such unrest.4 Leaders of Columbia 
chapters of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and Students Afro-American Society 
(SAS) united a disparate set of concerns to rally support from hundreds of students. These 
issues included Columbia’s perceived institutional racism because of its planned gym 
construction in municipal Morningside Park, the University’s complicity in the Vietnam War 
through its affiliation with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and the lack of student 
involvement in disciplinary procedures. All this occurred despite the meager membership roll 
of each student group.5 Before long, Harlem chapters of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and Mau Mau— 
along with many non-affiliated Harlem residents—also became involved in the protest by 
 
4 Student occupation of buildings as a form of protest occurred previously at schools such as Howard 
University, Bowie State College, Colgate University, University of Michigan, and Trinity College, and 
subsequently at Northwestern University, Brooklyn College, Boston University, Stanford University, the 
University of Chicago, and San Francisco State College. For general information on 1968, see Paul Berman, A
Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968 (New York: Norton, 1996); Carole Fink, 
Phillip Cassert, and Detlef Junker, 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); Maurice 
Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); and George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Boston: 
South End Press, 1987). For information on student activism in 1968, see Ronald Fraser, et al, 1968: A Student 
Generation in Revolt (New York: Pantheon, 1988). 
 
5 SDS was a national organization with local chapters at universities across the country. For 
information on national SDS, see Alan Adelson, SDS (New York: Scribner, 1972); Martha Webb Carithers, “A 
Social Movement Career: National SDS” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1982); James Miller, “Democracy 
Is in the Streets”: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987); and Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York: Random House, 1973). SAS was a Columbia organization. For 
information on Columbia SAS, see Jerry L. Avorn et al., Up Against the Ivy Wall: A History of the Columbia 
Crisis (New York: Atheneum, 1969); and Cox Commission, Crisis at Columbia: A Report of the Fact-Finding 
Commission Appointed to Investigate the Disturbances at Columbia University in April and May 1968 (New 
York: Vintage, 1968). Journalists for the Columbia Daily Spectator authored Up Against the Ivy Wall in the 
months following the crisis. In addition to its worth as a narrative account of the Columbia events, it provides a 
wealth of primary source material not otherwise accessible to researchers. For this reason, the present article 
will rely heavily upon the primary sources (speeches, fliers, etc.) collected therein. 
3occupying the communes, feeding the protestors, or participating in rallies.6 At the protest’s 
peak, between five and eight hundred people occupied five communes on Columbia’s 
Morningside Heights campus and several hundred more supported the protest program. 
 Despite the enormous scale of the protest and its renown as a seminal event in the 
student movement, the Columbia protest has failed to attract scholarly attention in recent 
years. While authors produced a wealth of literature on Columbia in the five years following 
the protest, more than thirty years have passed without an adequate reappraisal. In that time, 
the historiography of the New Left has changed dramatically. The tendency of 1970s 
organizational histories to view the Columbia crisis of 1968 as an important student protest in 
a movement of movements that spanned the late 1960s and early 1970s is no longer 
adequate.7 The more recent historiographical trend toward analyses of movement culture— 
exemplified in recent scholarship on the student left in Austin and Berkeley—offers a 
methodological approach that helps enrich our understanding of the Columbia protest.8
6 For the participation of Harlem activist organizations, see Stefan Bradley, “Gym Crow Must Go!: 
The 1968-1969 Student and Community Protests at Columbia University in the City of New York” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Missouri at Columbia, 2003); and Roger Kahn, The Battle for Morningside Heights: Why Students 
Rebel (New York: Morrow, 1970). 
 
7 For examples of the use of the Columbia protest as a stopping point in larger movements, see Miller, 
“Democracy Is in the Streets”; Sale, SDS. Organizational histories of the New Left are numerous. Those 
relevant to this particular study include, Adelson, SDS; Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black 
Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Ron Jacobs, The Way the Wind 
Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (London: Verso, 1997); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, 
CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Miller, 
“Democracy Is in the Streets”; and Sale, SDS. For the concept of a movement of movements, see Van Gosse, 
“A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left,” in A Companion to Post –
1945 America, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenweig (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 
277-303; and Van Gosse, Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretive History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2005). 
 
8 See W. J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War: The 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and 
David Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998). A similar trend is apparent in the historiography of the civil rights 
movement; for example, see Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the 
Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
4Specifically, the establishment of student communes invites a spatial analysis that 
emphasizes the distinct forms of political and social participation evident at Columbia. Sara 
M. Evans’ and Harry C. Boyte’s concept of “free spaces” offers a particularly compelling 
methodology for analyzing the Columbia protest. Evans and Boyte argue:  
Particular sorts of public places in the community, what we call free 
spaces, are the environments in which people are able to learn a new self-
respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills, and values 
of cooperation and civic virtues. Put simply, free spaces are settings between 
private lives and large-scale institutions where ordinary citizens can act with 
dignity, independence, and vision.9
Studying the Columbia protest through the lens of free spaces will reveal that the protest was 
more than a brief stopping point in a movement of movements; it is a critical event in 
understanding the nature of democratic participation in the New Left and the United States. 
The concept of free space facilitates the reinterpretation of the role of movement culture and 
society in the development of the Columbia protest and the New Left. Furthermore, free 
space analysis reveals a fact easily overlooked by straightforward political analysis: namely, 
the remarkable degree to which difference predominated among protesting students. Finally, 
it usefully accounts for the intersection of New Left politics and counterculture in the 
communes, and the decision of otherwise liberal students to engage in radical protest tactics. 
 Throughout the Columbia crisis, moderate and radical students alike attempted to 
synthesize disparate cultural, political, and social impulses into an activist identity. This 
project forced students to defend their ideals at the very moment of their formation and to 
grapple with conflicts rooted in political and social difference. Their synthesis—created 
within the free spaces of student communes in occupied campus buildings—functioned to 
fuse an eclectic group of young adults into a community united by their immediate political 
 
9 Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte, Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 17. 
5concerns, but also by their creation of a shared commune counterculture that challenged 
mainstream values.10 The communes were free spaces that enabled protestors to reconcile 
their political and social differences, and introduced Columbia students to the practical 
possibilities of democratic participation and student autonomy.  
 
Communal Roots 
 
Evans and Boyte indicate that free spaces are “defined by their roots in community, 
the dense rich networks of daily life.”11 At Columbia, the critical community institutions of 
1968 formed independently of one another years in advance of the protest. Furthermore, 
individual social networks established through SDS, SAS, Harlem civil rights groups, and the 
Columbia School of Architecture developed in isolation from one another and without any 
consciousness of shared interests between one another. During the Columbia protest, 
however, people from such disparate social organizations lived in communion with one 
another and built important new relationships through activism. The initial growth of these 
“networks of daily life” and their slow coalescence into a unified political community 
account for the eclectic social composition of the protest. Activists from each of these 
networks participated in the protest for disparate reasons; understanding these motivations 
provides the best means of accounting for the great scale of the protest and the creation of 
communes. Thus, before moving to a consideration of the communes themselves, it is 
 
10 “Community” is an admittedly slippery term. The present analysis will follow the work of C. J. 
Calhoun which suggests that communities consist of groups with closer internal relations than characterize 
society as a whole. Furthermore, Calhoun suggests that “this closeness seems to imply, though not rigidly, face 
to face contact, commonalty of purpose, familiarity and dependability” (“Community: Toward a Variable 
Conceptualization for Comparative Research,” Social History 5, no. 1 (January 1980): 111). 
 
11 Evans and Boyte, Free Spaces, 20. See also, 195. 
6necessary to analyze the prior roots of individual organizations and issues involved in the 
protest. 
 As early as the 1920s, Columbia’s trustees had dreamed of upgrading the University’s 
hastily constructed turn-of-the-century gymnasium, but a laundry list of considerations—not 
least the spatial limitations imposed by Columbia’s urban surroundings—checked expansion. 
The problem neared resolution in 1961, however, when Columbia obtained a contract with 
New York City to lease 2.1 acres of land in Morningside Park. Soon thereafter the University 
launched a ten-million-dollar fundraising campaign to support the project.12 Importantly, the 
terms of the agreement required Columbia to construct a $1.4 million public-access facility 
for Harlem residents that the administration understood to be a generous service to the 
community. For nearly a decade the project attracted little, if any, attention from the Harlem 
community or Columbia students. The administration anticipated that gym construction in 
Morningside Park would solve a logistical problem unique to the spatial limitations of 
Columbia’s urban campus while simultaneously endearing the University to the 
community.13 In order to understand how the gym issue evolved into a controversy, however, 
it is necessary to briefly shift our perspective and look up from the ghetto of Morningside 
Heights. 
From the perspective of the working-class black, Chinese, and Puerto Rican families 
living in the Morningside Heights section of Harlem, municipal Morningside Park held 
greater symbolic than practical import. On the one hand, the park was a rock-strewn 
 
12 Robert B. Stulberg, “Crisis background,” Columbia Daily Spectator, May 10, 1968, sec. C, p. 2.  
 
13 For the administration’s perspective on the evolution of the gym controversy, see Cox Commission, 
Crisis at Columbia, 75-89. The author would like to thank Roger Lotchin and David Sehat for their helpful 
insistence that the Columbia administration is part of Harlem and that its claim to Morningside Park—though 
problematic—was legally justified. 
7wasteland of little practical use, frequented more often by petty criminals and strung-out 
druggies than by energetic children or hearty recreationists. The park contained no exercise 
facilities and offered little in the way of diversion for the community. In practical terms, 
Harlem stood to gain a great deal from the gym; Columbia’s presence would likely eliminate 
the seedier sort from haunting the park and community members would have access to new 
workout facilities. On the other hand, the park represented an important buffer zone between 
Morningside Heights and Columbia University—that haven of white academia and leisure 
that looked down upon Harlem in the east from its perch atop the park’s craggy incline. By 
1968, Columbia’s encroachment upon Morningside Heights was well underway. During the 
preceding decade, the University had evicted more than seven thousand Harlemites from 
Columbia-controlled properties—85 percent of whom were African American or Puerto 
Rican—and many others continued to sign monthly rent checks to the University.14 One 
Harlem activist called Columbia’s president “the biggest slumlord in Harlem,”15 while 
another bemoaned Columbia’s “communicidal” policy toward Harlem.16 Meanwhile, 
Morningside Park remained one of the few tracts of sizable real estate unaffected by 
Columbia’s expansionist policy. Thus, the proposed construction of the new gymnasium 
sought to eliminate a sacred Harlem enclave—whatever its practical value.17 
14 Avorn et al., Up Against the Ivy Wall, 13. 
 
15 Arthur Kokot, “Two Black Leaders Support Strikers,” Columbia Daily Spectator, April 27, 1968, p. 
1. 
 
16 Avorn et al., Up Against the Ivy Wall, 13. 
 
17 The Cox Commission report similarly emphasized the symbolic import of gym construction: “The 
nub of the issue was that the community’s property was being used by a private institution, yet the newly 
emerging voices concerned with community action had no influence in the decision. Since the community 
affected was overwhelmingly black, this shortcoming symbolized all the injustices of both poverty and racism. 
Seen in that light and not as a practical arrangement and business transaction, the plans for a gymnasium 
building exemplified those injustices: Columbia would enjoy most of the building, assigning a small fraction to 
the people; Columbia’s students would enter from the Heights but its black neighbors through the cellar. From 
8From the perspective of the Columbia administration, however, the controversy was 
baffling. Not only had Columbia legally obtained the gym contract, but halting construction 
also stood to cost the University as much as five million dollars.18 Inept communication and 
conflicting visions for the use of Morningside Park set the administration and Harlem 
activists on a collision course; the conflict was all the more troubling because each proposal 
for the use of the park was legitimate in its own right.19 
Organized opposition to the Morningside Park development began with John 
Lindsay’s mayoralty campaign in the fall of 1965 and soon thereafter picked up steam. 
Drawing upon a report issued by a task force investigating New York City’s parks, Lindsay 
objected to gym construction because the immediate neighborhood had not been sufficiently 
involved in the process and because he opposed the development of parkland, particularly by 
a private interest. In January of 1966, sixteen Harlem organizations formed the West Harlem 
Morningside Park Committee to oppose gym construction. This antagonism soon spread to 
Columbia’s campus. The following month, the Columbia chapter of CORE voiced opposition 
to the project; the Citizenship Council, Graduate and Undergraduate Student Councils, and— 
quietly—SDS soon followed suit. By 1967, strains of community opposition became 
increasingly militant in their stances. At a Harlem community meeting in December of 1967, 
H. Rap Brown of Harlem SNCC encouraged citizen radicalism: “If they build the first story 
 
some viewpoints these characterizations are grossly distorted; geography determined the relative positions of 
the University and community entrances. Yet as symbols of relative power the characterizations were not 
inaccurate and carried enormous weight in the political and social environment then emerging” (Cox 
Commission, Crisis at Columbia, 87). For more on the gym controversy, see Roger Starr, “The Case of the 
Columbia Gym,” in Confrontation: The Student Rebellion and the Universities, ed. Daniel Bell and Irving 
Kristol (New York: Basic Books, 1968). 
 
18 Dearing Carpenter, “Estimates Differ On Gym Halt Cost,” Columbia Daily Spectator, April 26, 
1968, p. 1. 
 
19 For the development of the gym controversy, see Kahn, Battle for Morningside Heights, 89-97. 
9blow it up. If they sneak back at night and build three stories burn it down. And if they get 
nine stories built, it’s yours. Take it over, and maybe we’ll let them in on the weekends.”20 At 
the onset of the student strike in 1968, 60 percent of Columbia students and 59 percent of its 
faculty favored permanently stopping gym construction despite the administration’s and 
trustees’ legitimate acquisition of the project contract.21 The administration’s ownership of a 
legal contract left it with overwhelming power in the debate over gym construction; this 
power included the capacity to negotiate with the obviously distraught Harlem community, 
Columbia students, and faculty—an opportunity that the administration ignored.22 
While Columbia’s encroachment on Morningside Park attracted the attention of 
Harlem and student activists, another set of students attacked the University’s support of the 
American war in Vietnam. In the two years following its founding in February of 1966, 
Columbia SDS, in conjunction with other groups, organized protests against CIA, Marine, 
and Dow Chemical recruiting on campus and constantly harped on the administration’s 
“complicity” in the Vietnam War—particularly through its institutional affiliation with IDA. 
 In 1959, Columbia became an institutional member of IDA, an organization which 
the Department of Defense had created four years earlier to fund and organize university 
research on matters of warfare. Columbia’s affiliation with IDA was loose, unclear, and 
secretive; at the time of the 1968 protest, in fact, only three faculty members had ties with 
IDA and perhaps a dozen others had advised the organization at various times. In March of 
 
20 Avorn et al., Up Against the Ivy Wall, 20. During the Columbia protest, Brown echoed this sentiment 
at a press conference held outside Hamilton Hall; he declared that “if the Jim Crow-Gym in Morningside Park is 
built it will be blown up” (Steve Diamond, “Columbia: The Revolution is Now,” Liberation News Service,
April 30, 1968, p. 8). 
 
21 Allen H. Barton, “The Columbia Crisis: Campus, Vietnam, and the Ghetto,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 32, no. 3 (autumn 1968): 342. 
 
22 For a brief history of the Columbia administration’s intransigence in considering student concerns, 
see Paul Starr, “The explosion had a long fuse,” Columbia Daily Spectator, May 10, 1968, sec. C, p. 1. 
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1967, however, SDS began extensive research to uncover the nature of Columbia’s IDA 
affiliation. Over the course of the next year, SDS revealed information that embarrassed 
Columbia administrators and effectively caught the University in a web of complicity with 
the war effort. SDS also passed a resolution calling for the abatement of Columbia’s IDA 
affiliation. Although no single SDS effort attracted much attention from the student body, by 
early 1968, nearly 50 percent of faculty and students favored severing Columbia’s IDA 
affiliation.23 
In the spring of 1968, Columbia SDS was an organization of roughly one hundred 
students but played a disproportionately large role in campus activism. While the Cox 
Commission investigating the 1968 protest determined that “by early 1968, the IDA question 
had become SDS’ bread-and-butter issue,”24 professor of dramatic literature Eric Bentley 
argued otherwise: “The gymnasium is the Columbia issue par excellence.”25 Additionally, 
the proximate cause of the 1968 protest was a third SDS issue, namely, the discipline of the 
so-called “IDA Six,” a group of six SDS students whom the administration had placed on 
academic probation on April 22, the day before the initial occupation of campus buildings. 
SDS abhorrence at these symptoms of the monolithic American multiversity accounts for the 
conflation of such disparate issues into a common protest program and formed the basis of 
the protestors’ six demands: 
1) that construction of the gymnasium be stopped 
2) that all ties with IDA be discontinued 
3) that the ban on indoor demonstrations be rescinded 
4) that criminal charges arising out of protests at the gym site be dropped 
5) that probation of the “IDA-six” be rescinded 
 
23 Barton, “The Columbia Crisis,” 342. 
 
24 Cox Commission, Crisis at Columbia, 94. 
 
25 Stephen Donadio, “Columbia: Seven Interviews,” Partisan Review, 35, no. 3 (summer 1968): 366. 
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6) that amnesty be granted for the present protest26 
Of the organizations involved in the protest, SDS was the first to unite their concern about 
this wide spectrum of administrative policies into a single opposition platform. 
 Despite their uniform criticism of the war in Vietnam, Columbia’s gym plan, and 
student disciplinary procedures, SDS was hardly united ideologically. The Cox Commission 
found that “the Columbia chapter attracted a diffuse mixture of communists (Maoist and 
Soviet), humanists, socialists, liberals, anarchists, and a-politicals.”27 In particular, the 
organization split into two tactical blocs: the “praxis axis,” which emphasized public 
education and internal organization; and the “action faction,” which endorsed boisterous 
protest demonstrations.28 The schism within the organization reached a boiling point early in 
1968; SDS elections that spring turned into a referendum on its future tactical orientation. 
The March election of Mark Rudd to lead the organization marked a shift from praxis axis 
control toward confrontation politics.29 Thus, political difference defined the protest’s 
leading organization as much as did ideological unity.30 
26 Cox Commission, Crisis at Columbia, 104.  
 
27 Ibid., 56. 
 
28 Ibid., 56-59. Mark Rudd acknowledged this split, but argued for its insignificance in the final 
analysis: “For years SDS nationwide has been plagued by the ‘base-building vs. militant action debate—it took 
the revolution in the chapter at Columbia and the subsequent mass student rebellion to show the essential unity 
of the two lines, and the phoniness of the debate” (Mark Rudd, “Columbia: Notes on the Spring Rebellion,” in 
The New Left Reader, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: Grove Press, 1969), 294). On the one hand, Rudd aptly 
characterizes the capacity of the two factions to work in tandem; on the other hand, the factions were very real 
and served as a debilitating conflict throughout the New Left. 
 
29 Stulberg, “Crisis background,” sec. C, p. 1. For more on Rudd’s background, see Kahn, Battle for 
Morningside Heights, 98-108. 
 
30 For a thorough history of Columbia’s SDS chapter, see Kahn, Battle for Morningside Heights, 102-
14. 
12
 Despite student insistence that the six demands formed the core of their agenda, 
student radicalization was the foremost priority for SDS leaders. Mark Rudd stated forcefully 
that  
we see the goal of the student movement not as the creation of an 
eventual power base, involving all students around all their concerns, radical 
and otherwise, which is a very old conception of what we’re up to, but rather, 
building a radical force which raises issues for other constituencies—young 
people, workers, others—which will eventually be picked up on to create a 
broader, solider revolutionary movement.31 
In order to create a broad radical constituency, SDS had to radicalize previously moderate— 
or even conservative—students. Rudd thought that leadership by example formed a critical 
component of this process. “You have a core of students,” he explained, referring to himself 
and other radical leaders, “who stand for progressive change—for historical progress. The 
mass of students joins in at one point or another, either earlier or later.”32 The Columbia 
crisis served as an opportune moment to attract a mass of students to join the radical 
program. Other SDS leaders echoed Rudd’s sentiment. One former member of the SDS 
steering committee insisted that “if it comes to a choice between acting so as to build a 
radical movement and acting so as to bring about improvement of conditions, the radical will 
always give priority to the movement.”33 The immediate impact of this philosophy was to 
prevent successful mediation between student leaders—who cared little for immediate 
resolution and practical reform—and administrators. Institutional racism, complicity in the 
Vietnam War, and authoritarian disciplinary procedures were the proximate causes of the 
 
31 Rudd, “Columbia,” 302. 
 
32 Donadio, “Columbia: Seven Interviews,” 370. 
 
33 Avorn et al., Up Against the Ivy Wall, 30. 
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Columbia conflict, but Rudd understood that these issues were means to the end of 
radicalization:  
 Any particular issue we raise probably can’t change things all that 
much, but changing people’s understanding of society, getting them to 
understand the forces at work to create the war in Vietnam, to create racism: 
this is the primary goal of radicals. And the harvest of this planting will not 
be seen this year when we gain a modicum of student power, not in ten years . 
. . but sometime in the future when this understanding of capitalist society 
bears fruit in much higher level struggle. In revolution. . . . [W]e make no 
bones about this.34 
SDS leaders anticipated the capacity of commune space to unite an eclectic group of 
individuals and they sought to manipulate this capacity to their advantage. If SDS 
motivations for commune protest were myriad and complex, they were also crystal clear. As 
free spaces, the communes served as critical locations of community building and potential 
student radicalization. 
 While SDS involvement in the protest appeared to fit into the organization’s natural 
progression of protest politics, SAS had exhibited little interest in exerting political 
leadership on campus prior to 1968.35 Columbia recognized SAS as an official organization 
during the 1964-1965 academic year, when the University had an African American 
population of fewer than two dozen students. Intent primarily on addressing the campus 
concerns of African American students, SAS began to publish the journal Black Student in 
1966 and organized a black student conference in 1967. In the spring of 1968, SAS boasted a 
membership of 150 students and elected Cicero Wilson president of the organization; 
 
34 Donadio, “Columbia: Seven Interviews,” 374. This quote should illustrate the absurdity of Diana 
Trilling’s assertion that “it was interesting that in this social-political effort the word ‘capitalism,’ with its 
reference to specific injustice rooted in the economic organization of the society, was never mentioned” (Diana 
Trilling, We Must March My Darlings: A Critical Decade (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 92-
93). 
 
35 Kenneth Barry, “Challenge to Administration Strongest in School’s History,” Columbia Daily 
Spectator, April 24, 1968, p. 1. 
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Wilson’s election impacted SAS in much the same way that Rudd’s influenced SDS. More 
politically astute than previous leaders, Wilson became a champion for Harlem and widened 
the scope of SAS concern beyond the narrow bounds of Columbia University. Thus, SAS’ 
participation in the protest of 1968 was almost exclusively driven by its newfound concern 
regarding the University’s proposed gym construction in Morningside Park.36 The 
simultaneous emergence of gym construction as a hot-button political issue in Harlem and 
SAS’ newfound concern with the Harlem community accounts for the participation of SAS 
and various Harlem civil rights activists in the Columbia protest.37 
Students in the School of Architecture formed another important network that 
actively participated in the protest. Architecture student activists particularly protested 
Columbia’s fractious relationship with the Harlem community; in fact, one architecture 
student went so far as to announce an additional three demands related to Harlem politics on 
WBAI radio: “That the University should adopt an expansion policy that doesn’t overrun 
adjacent areas; that the University should make a conscious effort to recruit more black and 
Puerto Rican students; [and] that the administration should give greater recognition to 
students and community groups in the formulation of University policy.”38 Architecture 
student activism owed a great deal to the intellectual influence of two professors, namely 
Peter Prangell—who was no longer at Columbia in 1968, but who emphasized the social 
responsibility of architects—and Herman Herzberger—who espoused the concept of 
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“subversive architecture” to serve the needs of poor communities.39 The student editors of 
Touchstone magazine—which sought to make the profession “relevant to the major problems 
of this country”—were greatly influenced by these two professors;40 they were also 
influential leaders in the Avery commune. The faculty and students of the School of 
Architecture had formally opposed gym construction by passing a resolution in opposition to 
the plan earlier that year. Notably, students in the Avery commune—primarily occupied by 
graduate students from the School of Architecture—had little respect for SDS. A sampling of 
comments from Avery students bears this point: “I didn’t respect SDS;” “I never liked SDS;” 
“I didn’t care about SDS;” “none of us were members of any political group, certainly not 
SDS.”41 As a social network, the School of Architecture was initially isolated from the other 
groups involved in the protest, but student concern for Columbia’s policy toward Harlem 
explains their involvement. 
 While the relationship between Columbia’s architecture students and SDS initially 
faltered, the fragile alliance between SDS and SAS—so pivotal to the protest’s formation—
appeared to shatter when SAS and Harlem activists evicted all white students from Hamilton 
Hall at 5:30 on the morning of Wednesday, April 24. Understanding the rationale for the 
eviction, however, casts a very different light on the movement toward black separatism in 
Hamilton. According to SAS representative Bill Sales, the decision to evict white protestors 
was driven by their desire to establish an African American stronghold, but also by white 
students who were unwilling to escalate the protest. “White students were asked to leave 
Hamilton Hall,” Sales later reflected, “and told that if they really wanted to be relevant to 
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what black people in the community were doing they would go and take as many other 
buildings as they could hold. They subsequently did decide to take other buildings and to 
move their whole program from the level of communication and politics to that of 
confrontation.”42 Columbia activists created the communes from established social networks, 
but the coalescence of these groups into a single cohesive protest community remained to be 
accomplished. 
 The emergence of commune activism during the last week of April 1968, did not 
necessitate a birth of new protest communities on campus. Instead, the establishment of 
communes was rooted in existing “networks of daily life.” Evans and Boyte indicate that free 
spaces are places where people “build direct face-to-face and egalitarian relationships, 
beyond their immediate circles of friends and smaller communities . . . build networks and 
seek contacts with other groups of the powerless to forge a broader group identity.”43 At 
Columbia, the communes functioned as free spaces where disparate social networks 
eventually coalesced into a protest community of individuals who newly identified with 
collective activism. As they settled into commune life, however, they soon discovered that 
living in communion did not necessarily resolve conflicts rooted in cultural, political, and 
social difference. As we will see, minimizing the deleterious impact of these differences 
played a critical role in developing the communes as free spaces of collective social and 
political involvement. 
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Aspirant Egalitarianism 
 
Rooted in organizations of the Columbia and Harlem communities, the communes 
also functioned as egalitarian environments where participatory democracy held sway. This 
participatory structure became all the more apparent when considered in opposition to the 
authoritarian structure of Columbia University, where President Kirk ruled with supreme 
power. Evans and Boyte characterize free spaces as “public or quasi-public . . . participatory 
environments which nurture values associated with citizenship and a vision of the common 
good.”44 Although limited in their exercise of participatory democracy, the Columbia 
communes practiced egalitarianism to a remarkable degree and minimized the harmful 
impact of political and social difference within their free space. 
 While the relationship between black and white protestors appeared tenuous after the 
Hamilton eviction, the relationship between Harlem and African American protestors in 
Hamilton Hall developed into a mutually supportive and increasingly integrated community. 
Mutual support between Harlem and Hamilton, however, did not eliminate political 
difference. Instead it united disparate constituencies into a practical consensus to address a 
common problem. SAS representative Ray Brown acknowledged: “There’s probably a great 
deal of ideological difference between West Harlem [Community Organization] and Harlem 
CORE. But there was a consensus among all concerned—mainstream Democratic politicians, 
Republican bureaucrats and civil servants, militant activists and just regular community 
workers—that these student demands were valid and must be supported.”45 Brown added 
that, before long, Columbia’s African American students even viewed “themselves 
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essentially as an extension of the black community and that their primary identity is with the 
black community and not with the university community.”46 On Thursday evening, a group 
of Harlem activists marched across Columbia’s campus. On Friday, a large contingent of 
African American high school students entered campus to mingle on the lawn outside 
Hamilton Hall.47 SAS leaders emphasized the solidarity between Hamilton and Harlem in an 
open letter to the Harlem community that they distributed on Saturday: “Our victory is your 
victory. Your victory is our victory. Every victory for a Black Sister or Brother anywhere is a 
victory for ALL Black People everywhere.”48 The solidarity between Hamilton Hall and 
“Black People everywhere” suggests a uniquely public character in the free space of the 
Hamilton commune.49 
Perhaps the most overlooked characteristic of the Columbia protest is the extent to 
which the protest strategy effectively inverted the hierarchical relationship at the heart of the 
gym controversy. In protest of the perceived encroachment by a white academic institution 
upon a tract of land in an African American neighborhood, students and Harlem activists 
claimed a black-controlled space within the bounds of Columbia University. The irate 
response by Columbia’s administration to the supposed invasion of its campus only 
legitimized the protestors’ anger at the invasive nature of the Morningside Park development. 
Aside from the illegality of trespassing upon Columbia’s property, the protestors must be 
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credited for utilizing a distinctive strategy that dramatized the administration’s disregard for 
the community by similarly disregarding the administration’s claim to Hamilton Hall. 
Furthermore, by involving Harlem organizations from outside the traditional bounds of the 
University, Columbia activists aped the administration’s activity with government 
organizations such as IDA.50 
The African American eviction of white students from Hamilton obviously 
challenged protestor solidarity. Nonetheless, the experience sparked a renewed sense of 
purpose amongst SDS leaders and white protestors. They were determined that racial 
difference would not drive a wedge into the community. Eleanor Raskin, a Columbia law 
student, understood the relationship between black and white protestors with unusual 
perceptivity:  
The silence and discipline of the black brothers in Hamilton was 
impressive to the whole campus—the whole city, in fact. Stokely Carmichael 
and Rap Brown came and spoke in support of our liberation, and of all the 
demands of the brothers. There was no [interracial] split (although the press 
tried to publicize one) and despite many administration offers of separate 
negotiations, Hamilton stood firm with the rest of the buildings. The mayor 
wanted to hold off on the police, fearing a Harlem uprising. Every day and 
every night during the period of liberation, hundreds of black people would 
storm the gates (guarded) of campus in support of us.51 
A reporter for the Liberation News Service—an underground news syndicate—agreed: “The 
power of the students developed from the complete agreement between the blacks . . . and the 
whites . . . that both groups most hold out until the common demand of amnesty for all 
persons taking part in the demonstrations is met. On this all are in agreement and will not be 
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moved.”52 Upon the white liberation of four buildings following the eviction, the interracial 
alliance formed anew and remained strong throughout the crisis. SAS representatives and H. 
Rap Brown insisted that—despite the fact that opposition to gym construction was their 
primary concern—they would have remained barricaded within Hamilton Hall even if the 
administration permanently halted gym construction without budging on the other protest 
concerns.53 In other words, they were fully supportive of all six demands. Furthermore, 
although the communes were segregated, many protests on campus and in Harlem were 
racially integrated. At a Thursday night rally on Broadway, speakers from Harlem’s major 
activist organizations spoke to an interracial audience from the roof of a car before marching 
across campus. Harlem grocers even donated food to all the communes throughout the 
crisis.54 Perhaps the best indication of interracial solidarity, however, occurred before the 
crisis erupted. Tom Hayden was visiting the SNCC office in New York when he first heard 
about the crisis.55 His prior business with SNCC indicates that the SDS-SNCC alliance did 
not form merely in response to campus concerns. Nonetheless, campus issues did strengthen 
the bonds between Hamilton and the other communes.56 
Likewise, the practice of participatory democracy functioned to minimize conflicts 
rooted in political difference while advancing egalitarianism and autonomy in the free space 
of the communes. Participatory democracy—the guiding political philosophy of SDS— 
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sought direct involvement in decision-making and consensus amongst students. One student 
remembered: “In Avery, people had been very insistent on following this participatory 
democracy thing, where everyone had a right to participate in the meeting, where nothing 
was decided until everyone had a chance to say why he agreed or disagreed or simply what 
he felt about the issue, whatever it is.”57 In practical terms, the philosophy led to tireless 
debates that rarely produced consensus; in Fayerweather, students held political debates for 
up to eight hours daily.58 Whatever its shortcomings, participatory democracy approached the 
ideal of a leaderless movement and provided a convenient smokescreen to obscure the vital 
role of student leaders in negotiations with faculty and administrators.59 If any SDS leader 
recognized the tenets of participatory democracy, it was Tom Hayden, who had penned the 
organization’s founding document—the Port Huron Statement—in 1962. At Columbia— 
where he acted as the student leader in Mathematics Hall for four days—Hayden saw that 
“the theory of democratic participation held firmly in the occupied buildings.”60 
On the one hand, Hayden’s observation is apt. Rancorous political debate pervaded 
commune life where students confirmed all decisions by the Strike Coordinating Committee 
(SCC). On the other hand, the strike organization was an unwieldy hierarchical structure that 
left tremendous power in the hands of select SDS leaders. One representative of the Ad Hoc 
Faculty Group bemoaned the structure of the SCC:  
They were organized in such a way that negotiations were impossible. 
First, proposals would go to the negotiators, then to headquarters, then to the 
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steering committees in the buildings, then to the general membership in the 
buildings, then back to headquarters, and finally back to the student 
negotiators. They were not willing to break their solidarity, and they were 
constitutionally unable to negotiate.61 
If students celebrated the egalitarianism of participatory democracy, Mark Rudd certainly 
celebrated the power that the system’s bureaucratic inefficiency left in his hands. 
Furthermore, the rhetoric of radicalization emphasized by SDS leaders served to limit the 
range of political expression. Critic Diana Trilling convincingly argued that the emphasis on 
radicalization “demanded that one choose, simply, between conservatism and revolution.”62 
Although Trilling overstated her point, liberalism largely disappeared from the political 
spectrum, forcing many leftward leaning moderates to participate in radical tactics they 
might have otherwise denounced.63 From Kunen’s perspective, “threats of violence from the 
right will bring hundreds of the usually moderate to the SDS ranks just to align themselves 
against jock violence.”64 Thus, participatory democracy helped establish a community 
conceived as a level and transparent collective.65 
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 Gender provided another challenge to the communes’ egalitarian ideal. Despite the 
fact that Columbia College was an all-male institution in 1968, the presence of women from 
Barnard and Sarah Lawrence Colleges, and Columbia graduate schools established a 
coeducational environment that emphasized women’s rights within the communes.66 In fact, 
author and activist Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the occupied buildings were “one of the 
places where women’s liberation was born . . . just over simple things like women saying, 
‘hey, why should we be serving [and] preparing the food.’”67 The constant reference to 
“liberated zones” on campus was not an exclusively political term; it also included women’s 
liberation to varying extents. A notice hanging over the basement typewriter in Fayerweather 
Hall, for example, articulated the rule that everyone share equally in housekeeping 
responsibilities:  
TO ALL WOMEN: 
 You are in a liberated area. You are urged to reject the traditional role 
of housekeeper unless, of course, you feel this is the role that allows for 
creative expression. Speak up! Use your brains!68 
In this vein, a varsity wrestler headed Fayerweather’s food committee.69 Similarly, signs on 
Mathematics Hall’s bathroom doors read: “Liberated John: Men and Women.”70 
Furthermore, one study of the protest found that female members of the faculty were among 
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the most likely group of professors to support the demonstration.71 Despite the presence of 
rhetoric that encouraged men to share equally in housekeeping responsibilities, however, 
women more often performed the brunt of this work. At Strike Central in Ferris Booth Hall, 
student journalists noted that “hot meals were prepared by Barnard strikers and visiting girls 
twenty-four hours a day,”72 and women at Low Library prepared salami sandwiches and 
other snacks. Nevertheless, women and men alike were anxious to live together in the 
communes and attempted to establish egalitarian free spaces where women and men 
participated on equal political and social footing. 
 Admittedly, the Columbia communes were not purely egalitarian; however, the 
protestors did attempt to minimize the impact of political, racial, and social difference in the 
communes through participatory democracy and the language of liberation. Evans and Boyte 
are careful to note the likelihood of only a partial realization of egalitarian principles within 
free spaces: “Free spaces are never a pure phenomenon. In the real world, they are always 
complex, shifting, and dynamic—partial in their freedom and democratic participation, 
marked by parochialism of class, gender, race, and other biases of the groups which maintain 
them.”73 Bearing this in mind, we should not dwell upon the fact that Columbia activists 
achieved only a limited realization of their laudatory egalitarian vision. Participatory politics 
was more than simply a catchword at Columbia; instead, it served as the protest’s primary 
means of minimizing difference amongst activists. Furthermore, egalitarianism helped 
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coalesce a disparate set of community organizations into a singular, coherent, and 
autonomous activist community.  
 
Autonomy 
 
Not only did the communes foster participatory environments, but they also struggled 
to maintain their autonomy from the University.74 Columbia activists maintained their 
autonomy in two basic forms. First, they established political independence by creating their 
own institutions separate from those of the University and establishing specific demands that 
sought to realign the relationship between students, faculty, and administrators. Second, they 
created commune environments that fostered a unique community sensibility defined in 
opposition to the traditional university and mainstream culture. Following Evans and Boyte, 
the combination of these forms of autonomy offered protestors “basic alternatives to the 
conventional ways of the world, what might be called ‘movement cultures,’ that suggest a 
different way of living.”75 In order to create a free space where activists could unite in a 
participatory environment, the protest community had to maintain its autonomy from outside 
control. 
 The scale of student protest led to an important reassessment of the University’s 
identity. Whether the university was “a moral community,”76 “a community dedicated to 
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rational discourse,”77 “a defenseless place,”78 or “a place from which to launch radical 
struggles,”79 it became clear early in the strike that the protestors challenged the very fabric 
of life at Columbia. Columbia’s vice president considered the protest “a challenge to whether 
the University will be conducted in an orderly manner or whether it will be torn apart.”80 
Rudd insisted that what students “[are] really doing is removing themselves from this ideal 
situation called the ‘university community’ in an attempt to gain more leverage within that 
community.”81 Most observers agreed, however, that “the fundamental strategy of the radical 
student leaders is that . . . they’re operating from outside the community.”82 Regardless of 
whether students protested in order to assert a new role in a restructured university or sought 
to remove themselves altogether from Columbia, observers agreed that the radical nature of 
the protest, at least temporarily, threatened an unsuspecting university community.83 Activist 
autonomy—whether real or imagined—forced the University to reevaluate the role of 
students at Columbia.84 
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 The SCC operated as the most basic organization that intended to establish and 
exercise protestor autonomy. Protestors established the SCC on Tuesday afternoon to draw 
up the six demands and expanded as the liberated zone grew. Based on the third floor of 
Ferris Booth Hall, Strike Central coordinated the operations of the protest, distributed food 
and cash, and produced a vast number of leaflets. The SCC sought complete self-sufficiency 
and—aside from relying upon the physical space of campus buildings—largely succeeded in 
maintaining its independence from University support. The SCC brought together a core of 
six student leaders and representatives from each of four occupied buildings in an attempt to 
establish a degree of consensus across campus. Despite this goal, each commune maintained 
a distinct political culture. The SCC originally formed as an interracial body, but SAS and 
other black students removed themselves from the centralized authority following the 
Hamilton eviction. This removal did not necessarily indicate that interracial tension 
predominated amongst the protest community, but merely that African American protestors 
valued their autonomy within the overall structure of the protest.85 
The movement toward black separatism also contributed to the maintenance of 
autonomy by impacting the administration’s range of strategies for defusing the protest. By 
1968, the black power movement in the United States was strong; race riots in ghettoes 
across the country were increasingly common, including one in Harlem as recently as 1964. 
Thus, the administration cast a wary eye toward nearby Harlem and sought to calm the 
conflict in Hamilton Hall without arousing popular discontent within the Harlem 
community.86 The administration’s fears were well-founded; at a Friday news conference 
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outside Hamilton Hall, H. Rap Brown declared: “If the university refuses to deal with us, 
with the black brothers inside this building, then they had better be prepared to deal with the 
black brothers in the streets.”87 Furthermore, Columbia had made a concerted effort over the 
course of the 1960s to increase the African American presence on campus and did not want 
to alienate black students by failing to consider their political concerns. Immanuel 
Wallerstein, a Columbia sociologist who met frequently with Hamilton students during the 
strike, noted the importance of the African American presence during the protest: “If it had 
just been Mark Rudd and his friends going into Low Memorial Library, we would have had 
the police on campus in thirty minutes. There’s no question about it: it would have been an 
unpleasant but minor fracas in the University had there not been black students who 
barricaded Hamilton Hall.”88 If the SAS-SDS coalition was threatened by black separatism, it 
also functioned to facilitate the spread of radical tactics across campus without drawing a 
violent administrative response. By limiting the administration’s capacity to end the protest, 
it also helped maintain protest autonomy. 
 As the protest escalated, the student demand for amnesty from prosecution and 
university sanction increasingly emerged as the primary sticking point in negotiations 
between students and administrators. Rationales for insisting upon amnesty as a precondition 
for resolution varied widely amongst students. Ray Brown argued: “Our position on amnesty 
is a moral one. We believe that the University must grant amnesty because by virtue of its 
racist policy toward the community the campus is responsible for the situation on this 
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campus.”89 Another set of students replaced Brown’s emphasis on the racism of gym 
construction with the imperialism of Columbia’s IDA affiliation. In general, amnesty rested 
upon the claim that the University’s lack of moral authority forced students to protest and, 
thus, deprived them of responsibility for their conduct. Many students also latched upon the 
cause of amnesty to protect their educational investment and avoid the perils of criminal 
prosecution. Critics took pleasure in noting that students did not in fact demand amnesty—
“the exercise of [legitimate] executive charity”—but instead challenged the right of the 
administration to exercise any power over the university community; they questioned the 
very legitimacy of Columbia’s power.90 Thus, the amnesty demand—regardless of its 
semantic unintelligibility—can be understood as both a demand for autonomy and an 
acknowledgement of Columbia’s disciplinary capacity. Similarly, the student demand for a 
tripartite university disciplinary procedure—involving students, faculty, and administrators— 
simultaneously asserted an independent student position while recognizing the authority of 
the University.91 In fact, all six student demands—phrased as they were in the passive 
voice—tacitly recognized the administration’s power.92 
Were the protestors confused over the definition of amnesty, or did they recognize the 
multiple meanings observers would attach to the term? In all likelihood, both explanations 
are apt. However many students understood the proper definition of amnesty, the term 
became inextricably linked with student demands early in the protest. This momentum, 
coupled with the tumult of life in the communes, led students to uncritically utilize the term. 
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While many students failed to recognize the confusion over amnesty, others drew upon the 
nuances of the term to emphasize both student righteousness and administrative illegitimacy. 
 Because of the criminality of trespassing upon University property—to say nothing of 
holding an administrator hostage—the administration’s authority included the capacity to 
contact the police and dismantle the communes. Thus, the physical defense of the five 
buildings became a vital component of maintaining protestor autonomy. Defense initially 
consisted of the construction of barricades—formed by gathering furniture at building 
entrances—to prevent a police raid. In particular, the architecture students in Avery Hall took 
pride in engineering the finest barricades at Columbia.93 Avery also established the most 
creative plan for confronting the police upon the eventual raid of the commune; according to 
their plan, “each floor of Avery [was] set aside for people who wanted to express their 
resistance in a certain way,” with the most radical students occupying the uppermost floors of 
the building.94 The Fayerweather commune’s Building Defense Committee—charged with 
maintaining commune security—split into two factions: the pacifists and—in Raskin’s 
words—the “maniacs with guns.”95 Rumors of Harlem militants in Hamilton armed with 
guns and ingredients for Molotov cocktails also circulated throughout the week.96 If the 
armed defense of buildings was an impractical strategy to oppose an impending police 
assault, it was also an appealing method of resisting authority and asserting autonomy. 
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Furthermore, the administration’s reluctance to utilize city law enforcement to quell the 
protest legitimated student assertions of autonomy.97 
If the Columbia administration maintained an intimate link with the city’s law 
enforcement authorities, it also influenced mainstream press reports of the protest.98 
Columbia trustee Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, in fact, worked as the president and publisher of 
the New York Times, which ran notoriously pro-administration and anti-activist stories 
throughout the week. Furthermore, the major metropolitan dailies—to say nothing of the 
national media reporting on the incident—misrepresented the number of students 
participating in the strike, the degree of destructive actions taken by protesting students, the 
role of the faculty in the protest, and many other issues throughout the week. The student-run 
Columbia Daily Spectator—sympathetic to, but independent from, the protest—carefully 
catalogued these inconsistencies and placed a sign on its door to fend off “prostitutes of the 
national press.”99 Seventy-five students grew so angry over New York Times coverage of the 
protest that they picketed Sulzberger’s Fifth Avenue home on May 2.100 Another group of 
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students picketed the home of trustee William Paley, president of CBS, for allowing 
President Kirk to appear on “Face the Nation.”101 
Beyond protesting the mass media portrayal of the protest, student activists enlisted 
the support of underground newspapers and other forms of alternative media to set the record 
straight about the Columbia fracas. Liberation News Service, Rat, and other underground 
newspapers sent journalists to live in and report from the communes, where Columbia 
students rewarded them with unfettered access to commune life.102 Liberation News Service 
stories appeared in newspapers across the country.103 The campus radio station WKCR also 
broadcast important coverage of the protest throughout the week. The University trustees 
grew so resentful of its stories, however, that they forced the station to briefly shut down 
before the administration convinced them otherwise.104 
Students did not always assert their autonomy in such political forms. Equally 
important to many student activists was the creation of a new protest community grounded in 
a society and culture that challenged mainstream values. Faculty members noted this trend. 
Columbia literary critic Lionel Trilling argued for the cultural appeal of political 
involvement: “There has developed among young people an appetite for gratuitous political 
activity. . . . [T]here is . . . the desire to be politically involved, in some extreme and exciting 
way.”105 Trilling added that “for young people now, being political serves much the same 
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purpose as being literary has long done—it expresses and validates the personality.”106 
Another professor echoed this sentiment, noting simply that “a great number of people who 
acted were not specifically political in their motivations.”107 At least one student supported 
this view by admitting that “I’ll do anything to feel like I’m doing something.”108 In other 
words, political activity was not entirely political.  
To a great extent, students participated in the Columbia protest for the opportunity to 
create an authentic social and cultural community according to their distinctive values. Tom 
Hayden—borrowing from Fidel Castro—referred to the protestors as “guerrillas in the field 
of culture.”109 A reporter for the Liberation News Service described a cultural “revolution 
within the revolution.”110 Lionel Trilling echoed this sentiment in less emphatic terms:  
The actual issue, I believe, was—is—a very large and general one, 
best described as a cultural issue. The most radical students were expressing 
their doctrinaire alienation from and disgust with the whole of American 
culture. The less radical but still militant students were attempting to reach a 
new definition of what a young person is in relation to the institutions he is 
involved with.111 
His wife and fellow critic Diana Trilling—in her scathing critique of the protest—made a 
similar argument: “The revolutionary scene at the University represented the moral substance 
of contemporary art translated into actuality; indeed the triumph of culture over politics. . . . 
It was an event in contemporary life, an event in the culture of our time, a revolution in and 
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of modern culture.”112 Although culture and politics are not mutually exclusive as Diana 
Trilling suggests, culture was critical to the substance of student activism at Columbia.  
Of the five Columbia communes, students in Hamilton Hall established the most rigid 
protest culture. SAS and Harlem leaders considered themselves to be the vanguard of the 
protest and emphasized that orderliness would legitimate their cause to outside observers, 
including the Columbia administration. After the first day of the protest, SAS leaders 
maintained tight control over those entering and leaving the commune. They also monitored 
commune life: “Schedules were set up by the SAS leadership to provide eating periods, study 
periods, relaxation periods and sleeping periods. There was an interval set aside for bathing, 
beginning at 6 A.M.”113 Such rigidity, however, did not prevent those living in the commune 
from enjoying their time together and even fostered a community sensibility. Surviving on 
large cartons of food provided by Harlem CORE, Hamilton Hall became a destination for 
African American activists and politicians from across New York City. One woman who 
occupied Hamilton remembered that “the spirit inside was beautiful; there was singing, 
talking, dancing to music from small phonographs, watching TV, participating in the 
interminable meetings.”114 Her emphasis on the interminability of the political meetings 
suggests that life in the commune was not narrowly political; instead, the spirituality of the 
commune’s unique space and culture seemed to create unique community bonds. The 
orderliness and cohesion of the Hamilton commune also prevented the administration from 
dismissing it as merely an example of student rowdiness, a charge leveled at the other 
communes throughout the week. 
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 Avery Hall, more than any other commune, took on a distinctly academic feel. 
Occupied primarily by graduate students in the school of architecture, protestors in Avery 
carefully designed their barricades to maximize their repellant capacity. They also held a 
“design-in” to create a blueprint for gym construction on land already owned by the 
University, illustrating a unique enthusiasm for proposing alternative solutions to protest 
conflicts.115 The design-in represented an attempt to utilize the free space of the communes to 
revision the spatial dimensions of the University; it also indicates that students were 
genuinely interest in resolving the conflict on terms acceptable to Columbia students, 
administrators, and the Harlem community. Comparatively moderate at the outset of the 
protest, many protestors in Avery were the most politically engaged by the end of the 
week.116 
Commune décor—which overwhelmingly reflected a radical ideology—provided 
another medium through which to express activist ideals. In Hamilton Hall—prior to the 
eviction—an argument sprung up over whether a poster of Lenin ought to be hung in the 
lobby; when the Leninists won, posters of revolutionaries Che Guevara, Stokely Carmichael, 
and Malcolm X soon followed. Red balloons and crepe paper—the color of choice 
throughout the week to follow—adorned the walls and various students strummed guitars 
while a rock band set up for an afternoon concert. The milieu was restive and Hamilton 
quickly turned into an eclectic representation of 1960s student culture, a commune decorated 
in artifacts representing specific political values.117 Students similarly adorned the 
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Fayerweather commune in revolutionary regalia that included two red flags flapping atop the 
roof and Maoist posters pasted to the walls. Rudd insisted: “Every militant in the buildings 
knew that he was there because of his opposition to racism and imperialism and the capitalist 
system that needs to exploit and oppress human being from Vietnam to Harlem to Columbia. 
It was no accident that we hung up pictures of Karl Marx and Malcolm X and Che Guevara 
and flew red flags from the tops of two buildings.”118 
Of course, not everyone at Columbia was a communist. To illustrate the full spectrum 
of their political views, students adopted a symbolic language of clothing that facilitated 
individual expression without disrupting the community emphasis on solidarity. Blue 
armbands represented “peace” for some while meaning “conservatism” for others. Faculty 
members bore white armbands. A set of students who emphatically sought amnesty wore 
green armbands, while—most common of all—red armbands signaled those who sought a 
revolution, but not necessarily communism.119 This trend illustrates the degree to which the 
protestors respected individual expression while simultaneously emphasizing solidarity in the 
communes. 
 Music pervaded life in all the communes and provided a lighthearted method of 
expressing political ideals and fostering community. A piano in the rotunda of Low Library 
enabled one woman to give a brief performance of Chopin as an opening act for an 
impromptu concert by Professor Otto Luening.120 In Mathematics Hall, one student brought 
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in a stereo and dozens of rock and blues albums.121 At various points throughout the protest, 
students erupted in spontaneous song, most often evoking music of earlier civil rights 
protests such as “We Shall Overcome” and “We Shall Not Be Moved;” they inserted their 
own lyrics to these songs that were specific to the Columbia protest.122 
Loose sexual mores also attracted many Columbia students to the communes. 
Because Columbia College was an all-male institution, the coeducational commune 
environment provided opportunistic spaces wherein Columbia men and visiting women 
could—to the extent that sex was possible in crowded university buildings—explore their 
sexuality.123 To facilitate sexual expression, Fayerweather actually created “liberated 
bedrooms” in faculty offices.124 One student—who eventually settled in the Avery 
commune—remembered that in Fayerweather “there were couples screwing all over the 
building.”125 James Kunen—who pondered over the breast size of his fellow women 
activists—initially participated in the protest because he and a buddy decided that they were 
“absolutely bound to meet some girls” in Hamilton Hall.126 At the same time, however, 
Kunen argued: “I can assure you that the Columbia action cannot be dismissed as an 
overgrown panty raid, a manifestation of the vernal urge. It lasted too long; participants 
endured hardships, and worse, boredom, conditions through which collegiate fetishistic folly 
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could never sustain itself.”127 The lively cultural milieu and sexuality of the communes do 
not indicate that the Columbia protest was devoid of meaningful politics.128 
The personal component of Columbia’s political life during the protest was nowhere 
more apparent than inside the Fayerweather commune on Saturday night. As dusk faded into 
night, the students illuminated the flags that towered over the building and welcomed the 
Pageant Players, a radical mime troupe of street actors, to perform “guerrilla theater.” The 
plot consisted of a nation of peasants who ransacked their king’s castle and stole his crown. 
Eleanor Raskin described the affair: “[It was] a very simple and lovely play, which turned 
into a beat bacchanal . . . . It became a real primitive rite, more unifying and inspiring than 
any political rally could have been.”129 Revelers wildly danced, chanted, and waved candles 
while others destroyed an effigy of Columbia President Grayson Kirk to the rhythm of 
makeshift drums. 
 Just as the Pageant Players’ performance wound down, attention turned toward the 
back of the room where a woman appeared in candlelight, clad in a white sweater and white 
jeans, holding a bouquet of daisies. Beside her stood a man, neatly dressed, and as they 
proceeded to the stage area at the front of the room, the Reverend William Starr appeared at 
the entrance. The couple had been engaged for some time, but the electric communal 
environment in Fayerweather led them push their nuptials forward by several months. The 
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wedding vows were brief and Starr pronounced them “children of the new age.”130 Raskin, 
who had met neither the bride nor the groom prior to their occupation of Fayerweather, 
described the wedding as “by far the most moving one I’ve ever seen.”131 If the conditions 
inside the commune fomented hyperbole, they also bore little resemblance to recognizable 
forms of political protest.132 
Fayerweather’s guerrilla theater performance and the ensuing wedding each illustrate 
how commune cultural expression doubled as political activity and articulations of student 
autonomy. The plot of the Pageant Players’ performance reflected student discontent with the 
Columbia administration, and the destruction of Kirk’s effigy—however tasteless— 
articulated political discontent through cultural expression. The Fayerweather wedding 
likewise expressed commune autonomy through a familiar social institution. By taking their 
wedding vows in the Fayerweather commune without the oversight of a justice of the peace 
or any representative of the state, the couple asserted the independence and legitimacy of the 
protest community.  
 Protestor autonomy facilitated the practice of participatory democracy and functioned 
to unite disparate community organizations into a practical consensus. Beyond mere 
autonomy, however, students established new identities through the political culture they 
created within the communes. Free from elite control, students and Harlem activists were 
free to determine and act upon their own distinctive values. The communes were free spaces 
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where hundreds of students came to understand democratic political participation in new and 
exciting ways. But they were also destined to be short-lived. 
 
Columbia After the Communes 
 
Throughout the week of protest, Columbia administrators toyed with using the New 
York Police Department (NYPD) to break up the communes, but a variety of concerns led 
them to avoid such an unsavory alternative. Events over the weekend, however, created an 
overwhelming impression in the communes that police intervention was imminent.133 Shortly 
after two o’clock on Tuesday morning the NYPD’s Tactical Patrol Force (TPF) moved onto 
campus.134 After the police dispersal of the communes, protest support at Columbia 
simultaneously grew and splintered into numerous factions; both of these developments 
illustrate the degree to which the communes fostered the growth of democratic political 
participation on campus and the critical role of free space in perpetuating solidarity within 
the activist community.  
 What is most striking about the TPF intervention is the officers’ use of arbitrary 
violence—a critical factor in the growth of support for the protest after the dissolution of the 
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communes. Of the 109 injuries specified in the NYPD’s interim report on the ordeal, only 
thirty-two occurred in or near the five occupied buildings.135 Activists incurred the majority 
of injuries apart from the communes while the TPF cleared campus and dispersed crowds 
gathered around the Sundial, College Walk, and South Lawn at the center of campus. Of 
those students who saw police force used during the intervention, 74 percent described it as 
“greatly excessive to the point of brutality;” of faculty who witnessed the use of force, 66 
percent agreed.136 In over three hours, the police arrested 712 protestors, many of whom had 
never set foot inside the communes.137 Whatever its methods, the TPF cleared all five 
communes; the students in Hamilton Hall agreed to leave peaceably, whereas students in the 
other four communes forced officers to dismantle the barricades and drag them outside. 
 While police intervention successfully cleared Columbia’s campus, it also served to 
rally sympathy for the protestors and strengthen the bonds of community formed in the 
communes. The number of observers who thought that the occupation of Columbia buildings 
was “probably or definitely justified” increased 29 percent amongst students and 25 percent 
amongst faculty who witnessed police use of force.138 One observer suggested that “the 
‘bust’ confirmed the students’ new beliefs.”139 He added: “The worst incidents of brutality 
happened in Avery and Fayerweather, in which the moderate students predominated. Having 
wavered before, the students in these buildings now seemed intent on ‘proving their 
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manhood,’ and they resisted bitterly.”140 The shared experience of violence healed many 
divisions that may have developed over the course of the protest. The expectation of violence 
functioned similarly. In the lead-up to the TPF raid, Raskin notes, Fayerweather students— 
who in the days leading up to the raid had challenged the insistence on amnesty—banded 
together in community: “Monday night had been hectic—more songs and movies and great 
spirit of courage and unity. Many brothers . . . burned their draft cards; our newlyweds 
encouraged us and the expectation of the police unified our factions.”141 After her arrest, 
Raskin remained upbeat: “Its a good lesson, I think, for every law student, to take it on the 
other side—eight hours in jail (Jonah had twelve)—with no food, lights on all the time (after 
a sleepless night), forty sisters in one tiny cell.”142 
Although police intervention dispersed the communes, it strengthened the bonds of 
community. The shared experience of violence helped form a collective identity based on 
empathy and mutuality. The day after the police raid, a graduate student emphasized that the 
administration “thought that they were bringing an end to this strike yesterday, but in reality 
it has only just begun!”143 Another commentator noted: “Outrage grew from the thought that 
the sanctuary had been defiled. Many moderates were at last won over.”144 The fundamental 
purity of the student cause—as they saw it—allowed them to attach a peculiar grandeur to 
their experience of violence. It served as a baptism by fire and bound them in community. 
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The bonds formed during the protest did not evaporate, but instead expanded and took on a 
multiplicity of new forms. 
 Immediately after the police bust, the Strike Coordinating Committee constituency 
grew to include some four thousand students who organized a student boycott of classes that 
thousands more supported. Students called for a general strike within hours of the police 
intervention.145 The administration cancelled classes for the remainder of the week and soon 
established a policy whereby students could obtain passing grades for all classes in which 
they were enrolled without further attendance or completion of coursework.146 Raskin 
remembered that the communes became new social units on campus: “[We] continued to 
meet, on the lawns, in tents outside our buildings. . . . We hold liberation classes, rallies, 
concerts outside, and the sculpture classes are making us a symbolic monument.”147 The 
Grateful Dead played an outdoor concert, Beat poet Allen Ginsberg spoke to several hundred 
students, and a newly formed Strike Education Committee organized counter-classes in 
which they encouraged “all participants . . . to exercise their freedom to experiment with and 
create new and different forms and content, according to a continuing democratic 
procedure.”148 If the physical bounds of the protest could no longer be contained within the 
walls of five communes, students continued to cross the line between politics and culture in 
new and exciting ways that emphasized democratic participation and student autonomy. 
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While students from the communes successfully maintained support for the strike and 
alternative forms of education, new and smaller communities began to appear amongst 
protesting students. Kunen quipped that “everyone is organizing now—moderates, 
independent radicals, Liberated Artists, librarians.”149 Although the Strike Coordinating 
Committee continued its commitment to further the strike and deepen support for protest, it 
became increasingly moderate. Meanwhile, other students formed the Students for a 
Restructured University, a liberal group that sought reconciliation with the administration 
while emphasizing increased student involvement in campus affairs. Thus, while the total 
number of students involved in the protest increased dramatically following the police bust, 
they divided into distinct factions. The migration of some students toward liberal campus 
politics should not be construed as an end to radical protest at and around Columbia; the 
communes continued to meet throughout the spring and a large number of students remained 
committed to radical tactics. Nonetheless, the shift from the spatial limitations of the five 
communes to the open environment that followed made the negotiation of difference less 
imperative and contributed to the ensuing factionalization on campus. Apart from the free 
space of the communes, it became less vital to achieve consensus. Factionalization, however, 
should not be mistaken for the diminution of student political assertiveness. Indeed, the 
presence of liberal reform filled a void at a campus increasingly divided between 
conservatives and radicals.150 
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Three protests, in particular, indicate the persistence of student activism at Columbia. 
On May 1, Mark Rudd spoke next to various Harlem activists at a rally attended by one 
thousand spectators and which the NYPD again busted.151 The second occurred on May 17, 
when a mixed group of Columbia students and Harlem residents staged a sit-in at a 
Columbia-owned property to protest Columbia’s “tenement-removal tactics.”152 At the 
administration’s insistence, police arrested 117 protestors, nearly half of whom were 
students. Four days later, a group of five hundred students protested the discipline of four 
SDS leaders by again raiding Hamilton Hall. Before the night was over, police arrested 
another 177 students, 51 students and 17 officers were injured, and fires burned in Hamilton 
and Fayerweather Halls.153 Radical student protest persisted throughout the spring of 1968 
and the bonds formed in the communes during the last week of April continued to strengthen. 
The persistence of student radicalism at Columbia also took more enduring forms as 
activists who met in the communes formed organizations to continue important struggles 
around the city. Most notably, Mark Rudd and two other SDS activists helped form the 
Weatherman faction a year later and explicitly advocated the violent overthrow of the United 
States government. To a great degree, Weatherman developed as a result of an increasingly 
close alliance between Columbia SDS and the New York Black Panther Party that developed 
following the Columbia protest.154 More in the spirit of the initial Columbia protest, a group 
of students from the Avery Commune continued to meet following the protest and formed a 
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non-profit organization named Urban Deadline that operated into the 1970s on principles 
founded within their commune; a list of their activities—primarily urban social programs—is 
far too long to list here.155 
The impact of the Columbia protest on student activism persisted beyond the last 
week of April 1968. In new forms and organizations, students who first learned to be 
activists at Columbia continued in protest politics. The spatial limitations of protest were no 
longer defined by the strictures of five liberated campus buildings. The communes had run 
their course, but their legacy continued. 
 
Conclusions: The Politics of Space 
 
The lens of free space provides a methodological approach that makes sense of the 
disparate cultural, political, and social elements that students wedded throughout the 
Columbia protest. As free spaces, the communes facilitated the coexistence of individuals 
with radically different concerns. SDS founder Tom Hayden, for example, shared the plush 
confines of Mathematics Hall with James Kunen whose interest in the protest initially 
focused on his prospect of meeting women. Many others entered the communes with 
concerns similar to those of Kunen, but the protest experience often transformed the priorities 
of such individuals. One student indicated that life in the communes “was a process of 
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learning and relearning why we were there.”156 Rat also recognized the political awakening 
and social coalescence that took shape inside Columbia’s communes: 
 Participants by the hundreds realized new concrete possibilities in their 
lives and were forever changed. Alliances between black and white, between 
campus and the community, the exaltation of people over property and the 
unchallenged participation of outsiders in the struggle—ideas found only in 
radicals’ fondest pot dreams slowly emerged into realities.157 
Such transformations were simultaneously political and personal, and the environment in 
which they occurred dramatically shaped their development. The spatial dimensions and 
social milieu of the communes cannot be separated from the politics of the protest. They 
were one and the same. Admittedly, space cannot practice agency, but individuals may create 
spaces that radically impact political interaction.  
 Columbia was by no means the sole site of conflict influenced by the politics of 
space. Contrasting political spaces confronted millions of Americans four months after the 
Columbia protest as the 1968 Democratic National Convention unfolded on national 
television. Viewers saw meticulously dressed politicians deliver prepared speeches inside 
Chicago’s International Amphitheater, but also witnessed National Guardsmen violently 
disrupt the spontaneous form of democracy in the streets. It was precisely the formulaic 
democracy of political conventions that New Left activists sought to challenge in the late 
1960s, and the contrast between political spaces could not have been more dramatic. 
 To a great extent, this divide represents the fundamental tension between liberal and 
radical politics. At Columbia the conflict centered on the disputed role of the university in 
American life. Liberal intellectuals like Lionel Trilling understood the university to be a 
marketplace of ideas. Accordingly, intellectual exchange occurred in published texts, seminar 
 
156 Ibid., Prolog 3. 
 
157 Shero, “Blockade and Siege,” p. 11. 
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rooms, and academic conferences. In contrast, Columbia protestors understood the university 
to be a participatory egalitarian space. Accordingly, abstract intellectualism stood beside—
but not above or beyond—activism in defining the role of the university. In this way, the 
establishment of student communes during the Columbia protest of 1968 represented a 
political statement; activist space fundamentally reflected activist politics. 
The politics of space was not limited to the Cold War race to the moon. Activists 
struggled to mold the university into a free space that included students in participatory 
democratic politics. Understanding the environment in which students created their 
distinctive political culture provides an angle into activism that narrow political analyses 
cannot provide. Politics did not occur in a vacuum at Columbia, Berkeley, Austin, or the 
Sorbonne. Students created free spaces where the line between identity and politics blurred. 
They created a politics of space. 
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